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The United States Supreme Court recently handed down Gregg
v. Georgia, a decision that attempted to resolve the question of
the constitutionality of capital punishment. The author analyzes
that decision within the context of those that preceded it and
reviews decisions handed down by the Supreme Court of Florida
after it. He questions whether the law has really been clarified as
to the constitutionality of capital punishment, raising possible
challenges not only under the eighth amendment, but also under
substantive due process concepts.
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I. PROLOGUE-AN EXPLANATION
Two obvious difficulties beset one who attempts to analyze the
United States Supreme Court's recent decisions in the field of crimi-
nal procedure and to apply that analysis to Florida criminal proce-
dure: the field is so vast that it cannot be treated in any but a
superficial way; and the field has been changing so quickly that
fundamental principles and processes are often lost sight of while
events of the moment become the focal points of attention. In this
article, I have tried to meet these difficulties by focusing rather
narrowly upon the problem of capital punishment, to which the
eighth amendment is primarily addressed. The hope is that an in-
depth study of a selected area of criminal procedure can have a
representative significance for those who are actors in the criminal
field.
* Assistant Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
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II. THE RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
A. Introduction
At the end of the 1975-1976 term, the United States Supreme
Court, in perhaps its most important and certainly its most visible
series of decisions of the term, clarified its position regarding the
death penalty vis-a-vis the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the eighth amendment.' The statutes of Georgia, Texas, and Flor-
1. In the 1976-1977 term, the United States Supreme Court, instead of further clarifying
the law of capital punishment, appears to be adding more uncertainty into the area by
questioning the decisions it handed down in the 1975-1976 term.
The Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in the case of Gardner v. Florida, 45
U.S.L.W. 3425 (U.S. December 14, 1976). In this case counsel for a condemned defendant
asked the Court to hold that a judge who imposes the death penalty must disclose to the
defense all information upon which he intends to rely. The defense counsel argued that the
failure of a Florida judge to disclose portions of a presentence investigative report denied the
defendant any opportunity to rebut or explain the information contained in the report. The
information in the report referred to the fact that the defendant had been drinking heavily
before his wife's murder which came at the end of an argument about her refusal to tell him
where their children were. Furthermore, the report continued, death was caused by a severe
beating resulting in internal and external bleeding. The jury, which did not see the report,
recommended life imprisonment, but the trial judge overruled the recommendation, as he is
entitled to do under the statute upheld in Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976). (In Proffitt,
however, the jury recommended death.)
A Florida assistant attorney general argued that one ground on which the Court struck
down North Carolina's statute in Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976), was the
law's failure to provide a way for the sentencing authority to consider personalized aspects
of the defendant's character and record. He further argued that the presentence report pro-
vides this information, but that if disclosure is made mandatory, sources for such information
would dry up, interminable delays would be caused, and ultimately efforts to rehabilitate
defendants would be inhibited.
Mr. Justice Stewart appeared worried more about Proffitt than Woodson. He felt that
the Supreme Court had assumed, in holding the Florida Statute constitutional, that the
sentencing hearing would be conducted entirely in the open. "This Court upheld that statute
on the representations of the State of Florida and the decisions of its courts that this was an
open and above-board proceeding. This case gets here and it's apparent that it isn't." 45
U.S.L.W. at 3426.
Justices Brennan and Stevens were also troubled by the fact that the Supreme Court of
Florida affirmed the defendant's sentence without seeing the confidential portions of the
presentence report. Both pointed out that in a later Florida case, Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d
908 (1975), the Supreme Court of Florida imposed a duty upon itself in capital cases to
dispose of any issue which appears on the record. Mr. Justice Stewart also pointed out that,
under Tedder, a trial judge may override a jury's recommendation of noncapital sentencing
only when "the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that
virtually no reasonable person would differ." 45 U.S.L.W. at 3425. Finally, Mr. Justice Stew-
art angrily commented that "perhaps as many as three members of the Court" might "change
their minds" in view of the facts presented by this case. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1976, § A at 24,
col. 1. Such a change as Justice Stewart indicates could reverse the seven to two ruling that
upheld the Florida statute in Proffitt.
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ida, which provide guidelines governing the imposition of the death
On Tuesday, December 14, 1976, the United States Supreme Court was assured by
Attorney General Shevin that the Florida Supreme Court makes it a practice in all death
cases to look at reports of presentence investigation by the Parole Commission. The assurance
was sent to clear up the doubts of Mr. Justice Stewart. Miami Herald, Dec. 15, 1976, § D at
2, col. 1. Nevertheless, on March 22, 1977, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Stevens and in which Justice Stewart and Powell joined, reversed and remanded the
judgement. The Court felt that "without full disclosure of the basis for the death sentence,
the Florida capital sentencing procedure would be subject to the defects which resulted in
the holding of unconstitutionality in Furman v. Georgia." 45 U.S.L.W. 4275, 4279 (U.S.
March 22, 1977).
The Court also created new confusion in the law of capital punishment by announcing
that it would decide whether it is constitutional for a state to make the death penalty
mandatory for anyone convicted of killing a police officer. The Court said that it would
consider the issue in the context of a Louisiana man sentenced to death for killing a policeman
and under a Louisiana statute that had appeared to have been held unconstitutional in
Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S.Ct. 3001 (1976) N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1976, § A, at 24, col. 3. In
Roberts, the Supreme Court, by a five to four vote, reversed the death penalty sentence of
the defendant and seemingly declared the Louisiana statute unconstitutional. The Louisiana
Legislature, in fact, subsequently rewrote its death penalty law on that theory. Moreover, the
Roberts decision was viewed as rejecting the concept of mandatory death penalties, with the
possible exception of murders committed by persons serving life sentences. 96 S. Ct at 3006
n.9. The Court's announcement renders all the assumptions made following Roberts question-
able.
Thus the question arises as to whether the decisions rendered in the Supreme Court's
1975-1976 term actually clarified the Court's position on capital punishment.
The Court also made rulings on several other cases involving the death penalty.
On December 6, 1976 the Supreme Court issued an order reversing a murder conviction
and a subsequent sentence of death and remanding the case for further proceedings because
of the improper exclusion of one member of the venire. The Court reasoned that "[uinless a
venireman is irrevocably committed, before trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of
death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the
proceedings . . . he cannot be excluded; if a venireman is improperly excluded even though
not so committed, any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand." Davis v. Georgia,
97 S. Ct. 399, 400 (1976).
In White v. Texas, 45 U.S.L.W. 3415 (1976), the court granted the application for a stay
on the execution of the death sentence imposed by a Texas county court pending the timely
filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari.
In Gilmore v. Utah, 97 S. Ct. 436 (1976), a case in which the defendant desired to be
executed rather than face life imprisonment, a closely divided Supreme Court concluded,
upon examination of hearings held following Utah's imposition of the death sentence, that
the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of any and all federal rights he may
have asserted. Furthermore, the Court found that the state's determination of his competence
was firmly grounded. The stay of execution granted on December 3, 1976 was terminated.
Gary Gilmore was executed by a firing squad on January 17, 1977. For further discussion of
the Gilmore case see note 35, infra.
The Gilmore case may support the proposition that capital punishment, rather than
being a deterrent, actually may act as an incentive for people with death wishes to commit
crimes. The argument can be made that the Gilmore execution will attract those with a strong
death wish to commit violent crimes so that the state will sanction and carry out their deaths.
Under this theory the state will be guilty of encouraging two crimes: a violent criminal act
by the individual with a death wish and the "suicide" of the same individual carried out
officially by the state.
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penalty, were upheld.' The statutes of Louisiana and North Caro-
lina, which provided for the automatic imposition of the death pen-
alty upon conviction of specified crimes, were declared unconstitu-
tional.3
These decisions will be analyzed in terms of a change in the
policy and focus of the Court from its position in Furman v.
Georgia.I In Furman, the Supreme Court, ruling directly for the first
time on the constitutionality of capital punishment under the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment, declared
the death penalty, as imposed in Georgia and Texas, unconstitu-
tional.'
The discussion then will shift to an analysis of the recent deci-
sions' of the Supreme Court of Florida regarding the infliction of the
death penalty. The purpose of this analysis is threefold: (1) to de-
termine whether the review process utilized by the Supreme Court
of Florida comports with the standards enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court;7 (2) to determine the effect of the United
2. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976); Proffitt
v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976). For text of the Florida statute, see note 83, infra.
3. Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001
(1976).
However, the assumption that Roberts invalidated the Louisiana statute in all circum-
stances is now questionable. See discussion note 1 supra.
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. Three cases, Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas, were consol-
idated in Furman.
Many law review articles have extensively analyzed the Furman decision. For an in-
depth analysis of the opinion of each Justice, see Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited
Punishment II: The Eighth Amendment After Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REV. 62 (1972);
86 HARv. L. REv, 76 (1972); 4 SEToN HALL L. REv. 244 (1972-1973). For a comprehensive
discussion of the historical and legislative background of the death penalty up to Furman,
see Polsy, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, in 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 1
(P.B. Kurland ed. 1973); Comment, Furman v. Georgia A Postmortem of the Death Penalty,
18 VILL. L. REv. 678 (1973).
6. The recent decisions include those decided between January 1, 1976 and December
1, 1976. For a brief discussion of earlier cases see Tatum & Marx, Criminal Law and Proce-
dure, Twelfth Survey of Florida Law: Part Three, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 635, 704 (1976);
Chatilovicz, Berkowitz & Frisch, Criminal Law and Procedure, Eleventh Survey of Florida
Law: Part Four, 28 U. MiMbi L. REv. 815, 877 (1974).
7. The process used by Florida to review death penalty sentences was discussed by the
United States Supreme Court in Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2967, 2969-70 (1976).
Pursuant to Florida Statute section 921.141(4) (1975), the judgment of conviction and the
sentence of death is subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida within sixty
days after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record. The time limit may be
[Vol. 31:841
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States Supreme Court decisions on future Florida cases; and (3) to
examine possible challenges to various facets of capital punishment
that were not considered by the United States Supreme Court.
B. Furman v. Georgia
The death sentences which were before the United States Su-
preme Court in Furman v. Georgia8 were vacated in a brief per
curiam order. The Court held, in a 5-4 opinion, "that the imposition
and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments."I Five Justices joined in this order, but each wrote a
separate opinion articulating his own reasons for vacating the sent-
ences, and none of the Justices joined in the opinion of any other.
Mr. Justice Brennan'0 and Mr. Justice Marshall" focused upon the
essence of the death penalty itself, rather than the method used to
impose it.
Both Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded, after historical
analysis, that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional. The
primary consideration of Justice Brennan was that the eighth
amendment bars punishment which by its severity is degrading to
human dignity.12 Justice Marshall's historical analysis reached back
to English law in 1583. He concluded that the eighth amendment
must draw its meaning from "the evolving standards of decency 3
extended by the supreme court for good cause shown for a time period not to exceed thirty
days. The Court approved this system of review based upon cases decided by the Supreme
Court of Florida during the period of time between 1973 and early 1976. The scope of the
present analysis will be limited to the cases decided subsequent to January 1, 1976. For the
most recent cases to be heard by the United States Supreme Court see note 1, supra.
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Petitioner Furman, a black man, had been convicted of murder,
and petitioners Jackson and Branch, also black, had been convicted of rape. Each had been
sentenced to death, and in each case the decision to impose the death penalty had been left
to the jury.
Furman was decided in the context of great ferment in the case law over the death
penalty. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510 (1968).
9. 408 U.S. at 239-40. The eighth amendment has been held applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
10. 408 U.S. at 257.
11. Id. at 314.
12. Id. at 281.
13. This phrase was first used to describe the historical flexibility in the interpretation
of the eighth amendment in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Opinion of Warren, C.J.).
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that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 4 He then equated the
"excessive and unnecessary" test for determining whether a punish-
ment is cruel and unusual with a substantive due process test. 5
[Blecause capital punishment deprives an individual of a fun-
damental right (i.e., the right to life) . . . the State needs a
compelling interest to justify it . . . . [Piunishment may not be
more severe than is necessary to serve the legitimate interests of
the State."
Mr. Justice Douglas grounded his analysis in the concept that
the death penalty statutes were unconstitutional because, as im-
posed, they violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. '1
The two most significant opinions in Furman are those of Jus-
14. 408 U.S. at 329.
15. In Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392
(2d Cir. 1975) and Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit held
that although the cruel and unusual punishment clause may not be applicable to the treat-
ment of unconvicted detainees, the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment entitled the detainees, who were challenging the living conditions in the jail, to
protection from such cruel and unusual treatment. For further discussion on the use of the
due process clause rather than the eighth amendment to prohibit cruel and unusual punish-
ment see the various opinions of the judges of the Fifth Circuit in Anderson v. Nosser, 456
F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1972). As Judge Goldberg states in his opinion:
There are many roads to Rome, and while one is clearly marked "Eighth Amend-
ment," I agree that passage can be had along that wide, familiar boulevard known
as "Due Process." 456 F.2d at 843.
In Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1975), the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts used both the due process and cruel and unusual punishment clauses of
the state constitution to find the death penalty, as imposed in a case of murder in the first
degree committed in the course of rape, unconstitutional. The court reasoned, under substan-
tive due process standards, that a statute affecting fundamental rights must be shown to
serve a compelling governmental interest and that a heavy burden fell on the state to show
such an interest. Furthermore, the statutory scheme must be shown to be the least onerous
method of reaching the compelling governmental goal. If an alternative means exists by which
the state can fulfill its purpose, which has less adverse an affect on fundamental constitu-
tional rights, "the State is required to use the less restrictive, more precisely adapted means."
339 N.E.2d at 678. Finding life to be the most fundamental of all rights, the court held that
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts did not demonstrate that the death penalty was a
deterrent superior to lesser punishment.
For further analysis of substantive due process, see Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269 (1975); see note 45 infra.
16. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 359-60 n.141 (1972) (citations omitted). The plural-
ity opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2926 (1976), expressly rejected the proposition
that the legislature must select the least severe penalty possible.
17. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972).
[Vol. 31:841
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
tices Stewart" and White. 9 Both Justices focused on the arbitrary
and capricious imposition of the death penalty. No legislative pur-
pose-neither retribution nor deterrence, both viewed as legitimate
legislative purposes-could be served where the death penalty was
imposed in this manner and at such infrequent intervals. However,
neither Justice found it necessary to rule on the ultimate issue of
whether the death penalty was unconstitutional per se. The signifi-
cance of these opinions lies in the fact that both Justices subse-
quently ruled that the death penalty as imposed by Georgia, Texas,
and Florida" was constitutionally permissible.
Each dissenting Justice in Furman also wrote his own opin-
ion.2 These opinions were grounded on two bases. First, from a
historical perspective, the death penalty always has been accepted
as a legitimate punishment. This alone was considered to be a con-
stitutionally adequate foundation. In support of this contention,
Mr. Justice Powell emphasized the affirmative references to capital
punishment in the United States Constitution. 3
The second basis was the impermissible judicial encroachment
on the power of the legislature to determine the punishment im-
posed for violations of the law. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Jus-
tices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, emphasized that the pre-
sumption that the legislative judgment embodies "the basic stan-
dards of decency prevailing in the society. . . .can only be negated
by unambiguous and compelling evidence of legislative default."' 4
Thus, after Furman it remained unclear what procedures, if
any, could be employed to impose the death penalty in a manner
that comports with the requirements of the eighth amendment.
1I1. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In response to Furman, state legislatures enacted two types of
18. Id. at 306.
19. Id. at 310.
20. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976); Proffitt
v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976).
21. Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Blackmun, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice
Rehnquist.
22. It is important to note that the dissenters displayed a high degree of solidarity and,
unlike the concurring Justices, each joined in the others' opinions, with the exception of Mr.
Justice Blackmun's opinion, which was couched in personal terms.
23. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 417 (1972).
24. Id. at 384.
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death penalties-the discretionary type, which provided for the con-
sideration of specific factors before the imposition of the death pen-
alty, and the mandatory type, which provided for the automatic
infliction of the death penalty for the commission of specified
crimes.25 The constitutionality of these statutes was determined in
Gregg v. Georgia"5 and its companion cases. 7
In Gregg, the Court began its analysis by rejecting the argu-
ment that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional.2 8 The plu-
rality opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Stewart and joined by Mr.
Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Stevens," adopted the philosophy
and rationale of the Furman dissenters. The plurality held that
although the eighth amendment prohibits excessive punishments,0
25. See Browning, The New Death Penalty Statutes: Perpetuating a Costly Myth, 9
GONZ. L. REv. 651 (1974), for a comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of capital
punishment and a detailed examination of the statutes that were passed in response to
Furman. The traditional discretionary aspects in the impositon of capital punishment, ana-
lyzed in terms of the concurring opinions in Furman and the various legislative responses to
Furman, are discussed in Note, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 651 (1974).
26. 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
27. Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).
28. 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2922-23 (1976).
29. The plurality which announced the judgment of the Court in all five cases was
composed of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens. Their analysis of constitutionality per se
began with an historical overview of death penalty cases decided by the Court over the years.
Prior to Furman, the plurality noted, the Court had several times "both assumed and asserted
the constitutionality of capital punishment." Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2922 (1976).
Whether the death penalty had come to constitute cruel and unusual punishment per se was
not faced by the Court until Furman, and it was not resolved even then. Furthermore, an
examination of precedents such as Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), and Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), dealing with the constitutionality of various forms of punish-
ment under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment revealed
"that the Eighth Amendment has, not been regarded as a static concept" and that "[tihe
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2925 (1976) (citations
omitted). This meant that contemporary values concerning the death penalty must be as-
sessed. However, this assessment calls for an analysis of objective indicia reflecting the public
attitude toward a particular sanction. The plurality continued by noting that the penalty
must do more than satisfy public perceptions of standards of decency; it must also accord
with the basic concept which underlies the eighth amendment: Man's dignity.
The Court continued: "This means, at least, that the punishment not be 'excessive'."
Id. at 2925.
30. The parameters governing the determination of "excessiveness" were described as
follows:
First, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain. Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity
of the crime. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2925 (1976) (citations omitted).
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"the requirements of the Eighth Amendment must be applied with
an awareness of the limited role . . .[of] the courts."', The Court
emphasized the presumption of validity that must be accorded to a
punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature, and
noted that the judiciary "may not require the legislature to select
the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is
not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved."' ,
Both the weight of the legislative judgment in assessing contempo-
rary standards and considerations of federalism assume prominence
here, as does the fact that the selection of the particular punishment
is peculiarly within the legislative sphere. This analysis implicitly
rejects the compelling state interest-substantive due process test
suggested by Mr. Justice Marshall in Furman.33 Thus the shift in
the attitude of the Court from one where it liberally construed the
Court's power under the Constitution to one where it sees a very
narrow basis for using the Constitution to "interfere" with the
states' rights became readily apparent.
The plurality also adopted the second basic theme of the
Furman dissenters, that the death penalty never has been consid-
ered inherently cruel and unusual punishment and society today
has continued to regard it "as an appropriate and necessary crimi-
nal sanction. '3 Three indices were utilized to reach this conclusion:
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2926. This explicity rejects the analysis used by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1975); see note 15
supra.
33. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
34. The new plurality's citations to the dissenting Furman opinions of Chief Justice
Burger, Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Mr. Justice Powell, all within the same paragraph, further
emphasize this shift. 96 S. Ct. at 2926.
35. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2928 (1976).
The public's acceptance of the death penalty recently was demonstrated in Utah. Gary
Gilmore, sentenced to death, requested that he be allowed to die as soon as possible before a
firing squad at Utah State Prison. Miami Herald, Nov. 12, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 2. After the
Supreme Court of Utah agreed to allow Gilmore to waive his appeal and be executed, more
than two dozen persons volunteered to participate on the firing squad. Miami News, Nov.
11, 1976, ]] A, at 1, col. 4. On Monday, December 13, 1976, the United States Supreme Court
terminated its stay of the execution of Gilmore. The Court, in a five-four ruling, found that
Gilmore competently waived any rights he might have had to delay his own death by a firing
squad. 45 U.S.L.W. 4053 (1976); see note 1 supra. Gilmore twice attempted to commit
suicide, but failed. Miami Herald, Dec. 17, 1976, § A, at 2, col. 3. On Friday, December 17,
1976, Gilmore won another court victory in his quest to be executed. The United States
Supreme Court rejected a plea from Gilmore's mother to reconsider its refusal to block his
execution 45 U. S. L. W. 3449 (1976).
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1) The legislatures of at least thirty-five states had enacted post-
Furman statutes that provided for the death penalty; 2) in the only
statewide referendum on the issue, the people of California adopted
a constitutional amendment that authorized capital punishment;
3) the jury can be used as a significant and reliable index of contem-
porary values.
36
The plurality concluded its analysis of the constitutionality of
the death penalty by considering the social purposes of the punish-
ment and the proportionality of the punishment in relation to the
crime. It held that the eighth amendment required more than con-
temporary acceptance of a punishment. There also must be some
penological justification for it. This justification is provided by the
service of two social purposes: retribution and deterrence.37
Studies regarding the deterrent effect of capital punishment
were viewed as inconclusive." The Court, however, adopted the pos-
ition that lack of deterrence must be proven in order to invalidate
the death penalty, rather than the position that affirmative proof
Another bizarre aspect to the Gilmore case was raised after a federal judge in Texas ruled
on Monday,- January 3, 1977, that executions in that state could be filmed. Although this
decision does not now affect Utah, it may in the future. However, Gilmore expressed his
opposition to the filming of his execution. Miami Herald, Jan. 6, 1977, § B, at 8, col. 1.
Gilmore was finally executed by a firing squad on January 17, 1977. Miami Herald, Jan. 18,
1977, § A, at 1, col. 5.
Gilmore's desire to die immediately, rather than spend any more time in prison, focuses
on another aspect of the cruelty and unusualness of the death penalty: i.e., the concept that
the attendant mental suffering of a convict under a sentence of death is itself cruel and
unusual punishment, apart from the actual death sentence. For a detailed analysis of this
proposition, see 57 IOWA L. Rlv. 814 (1972). See also MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 144-48 (1973), wherein the proceedings of the case
of Robert Lee Massie are discussed. Massie's lawyer filed an appeal of Massie's death sent-
ence in the United States Supreme Court, contrary to Massie's instruction. Thereupon,
Massie filed his own motion to dismiss this petition on the ground that he no longer had any
interest in the issue being litigated: his life. At this point what measures may the lawyer take
consistent with legal ethics? Is he obligated to follow his client's desires?
36. The plurality cites the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Furman, to
support this contention. Chief Justice Burger interpreted the infrequency of jury verdicts
imposing the death sentence to "reflect the humane feeling that this ... sanction should be
reserved for a small number of extreme cases" rather than to indicate a general rejection of
capital punishment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 388, discussed in Gregg v. Georgia, 96
S. Ct. at 2929.
37. For an excellent analysis of the theories and justification for criminal punishment
see H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
38. For a comprehensive analysis of two conflicting studies on the deterrent effect of
capital punishment see Statistical Evidence on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment,
85 YALE L.J. 164 (1975); Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich and His
Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359 (1976); Ehrlich, Rejoinder, 85 YALE L. J. 368 (1976).
[Vol. 31:841
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of deterrence is necessary to uphold the death penalty. Moreover,
the Court returned to its "legislative function" rationale and stated
that state legislatures were better equipped to evaluate the results
of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and thus
could properly find a deterrent effect.
Furthermore, the Court implied that even if deterrence was not
a factor, retribution alone would be sufficient justification in some
cases:
Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be the appro-
priate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the com-
munity's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an
affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the
penalty of death.3"
The ultimate significance of the concurring opinions of Mr.
Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White in Furman become apparent
here. Both Justices had stated in Furman, unlike the other concur-
ring Justices, that retribution and deterrence were both valid legis-
lative purposes. Therefore, in the present cases, where the death
penalty was imposed with a degree of regularity so that these pur-
poses might be served,"0 it was constitutionally permissible.
In view of these social purposes, the plurality concluded that
where capital punishment is imposed for the crime of deliberate
murder, it is not a disproportionate penalty. The Court expressly
left undecided the proportionality of the sanction where no victim's
life has been taken."
The dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan'2 and Mr. Jus-
tice Marshall' 3 emphasize the policy change that the Court under-
went. The focus of the plurality was viewed to rest upon the proce-
dure used to impose the death penalty, rather than the essence of
the penalty itself." The dissenters emphasized that it is the penalty
itself that is cruel and unusual.' 5
39. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2930 (1976) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
40. The basic objection to the Furman statutes was that the penalty was imposed so
arbitrarily and freakishly that it could not possibly serve any purpose. Here, although it has
not been proven that a purpose is served, it is sufficient that one might possibly be served.
41. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 n.35 (1976).
42. Id. at 2971.
43. Id. at 2973.
44. Id. at 2971. This is consistent with their analysis in Furman.
45. The scope of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment
extends beyond criminal punishments and the procedures used to inflict these punishments.
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Mr. Justice Brennan viewed the issue as essentially a moral
question. The cruel and unusual punishment clause "embodies in
An interesting comparison can be made between these "criminal" contexts and the "civil"
situations to which the eighth amendment has been applied. See Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d
1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (administration of a drug which induces vomiting as part of behavioral
modification treatment); Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972) (rehabilitation of
juveniles pursuant to a statute which did not authorize any punishment); Rozecki v.
Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972) (unintentional deprivation of adequate heating for pa-
tients civilly committed or committed for observation); New York State Ass'n. for Retarded
Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (civil commitment for status);
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (civil commitment for status); In-
mates of Boys' Training School v. Affieck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972) (the absence of
criminal incarceration did not prohibit the consideration of an eighth amendment claim
regarding the conditions of confinement).
On November 2 and 3, 1976, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments
regarding the applicability of the cruel and unusual punishment clause and the due process
clause to corporal punishment administered by public school officials. Ingraham v. Wright,
45 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1976). The junior high school student plaintiffs disagreed that
the cruel and unusual punishment clause is limited to a criminal context. Although when
enacted, the clause was directed to methods of punishing criminals, plaintiffs asserted that
the inherent flexibility of the clause mandates a broader interpretation that is in keeping with
contemporary values. Counsel stated, "This Court has recognized that for a principle to be
vital it must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." 45
U.S.L.W. at 3337. Plaintiffs further argued that the eighth amendment is invoked and the
procedural due process guarantees apply whenever an instrument is used to inflict bodily
harm upon public school children.
Counsel for the schoolboard argued that the eighth amendment did not apply at all. In
response to questions by Mr. Justice Stevens and Mr. Justice Blackmun, counsel asserted
that if there were two inmates in a mental institution, one civilly committed and one crimi-
nally committed, the eighth amendment protections would apply only to the criminally
committed inmate. 45 U.S.L.W. at 3338.
Although the issue was not briefed by the parties, Mr. Justice Stevens suggested the
applicability of substantive due process guarantees as an alternative to the cruel and unusual
punishment clause.
In rebuttal plaintiffs emphasized that the element of punishment was the key factor
involved, rather than the element of criminal activity. 45 U.S.L.W. at 3339.
The Supreme Court dismissed the case on April 19, finding that the guarantees of the
eighth amendment apply to convicted criminals, not to students who are in a school open to
public scrutiny. 45 U.S.L.W. 4364 (U.S. April 19, 1977). "The prisoner and the school child
stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction
and incarceration." Id. at 4369. An argument can therefore still be made that the eighth
amendment guarantees do apply to those cruelly committed to mental health institutions.
For a discussion of various specific aspects of cruel and unusual punishment, see Annot.,
27 A.L.R. FED. 110 (1976) (Impositon of enhanced sentence under recidivist statute); Annot.,
25 A.L.R. FED. 431 (1975) (Administration of corporal punishment in the public school sys-
tem); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 3d 960 (1973) (Validity of statutes authorizing asexualization or
sterilization of criminal or mental defectives); Annot., 51 A.L.R. 3d 111 (1973) (Prison condi-
tions as amounting to cruel and unusual punishment); Annot., 33 A.L.R. 3d 335 (1970)
(Length of sentences); Annot., 24 A.L.R. 2d 350, 362 (1952) (Cruel-and unusual punishment
under statutes relating to sexual psychopaths).
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unique degree moral principles restraining the punishments that
our civilized society may impose on those persons who transgress its
laws."'" Thus "the State, even as it punishes, must treat its citizens
in a manner consistent with their intrinsic worth as human
beings."47 This premise led him to the conclusion that since the
death penalty necessarily denies the executed person's humanity, it
ig therefore excessive and constitutionally impermissible.
Mr. Justice Marshall criticized the validity of the two social
purposes used by the Court as justification for the penalty. First, he
attacked the study by Isaac Ehrlich s which is the only study to
support the deterrent effect of capital punishment. Thereupon, he
concluded that the evidence remained convincing that "'capital
punishment is not necessary as a deterrent to crime in our so-
ciety.' "949
Mr. Justice Marshall then denounced the policy expressed by
the plurality, that retribution is an adequate justification for the
death penalty:
[Sluch a punishment has as its very basis the total denial of the
wrongdoer's dignity and worth.
The death penalty, unnecessary to promote the goal of de-
terrence or to further any legitimate notion of retribution, is an
excessive penalty forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. .... 10
After the initial determination that the death penalty is not per
46. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2972 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice
Brennan might well have quoted from the arguments of Albert Camus. To Camus the death
penalty
is not simply death .... It is a murder, to be sure, and one that arithmetically
pays for the murder committed. But it adds to death a rule, a public premedita-
tion known to the future victim, an organization, in short, which is in itself a
source of moral sufferings more terrible than death . . . .For there to be equiva-
lence, the death penalty would have to punish a criminal who had warned his
victim of the date at which he would inflict a horrible death on him and who, from
that moment onward, had confined him at his mercy for months. Such a monster
is not encountered in private life.
A. CAMus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in REsISTANCE, REBELLION AND DEATH 131, 151-52
(Modern Library ed., J. O'Brien trans. (1960)).
47. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2972 (1976) (Brennan J., dissenting).
48. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death,
65 Am. ECON. REV. 397 (1975).
49. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2975 (1976) (Marshall J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
50. Id. at 2977 (footnote omitted).
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se unconstitutional,5 the Court examined the specific statutes of
five states.52
In Woodson v. North Carolina,5" the United States Supreme
Court held that North Carolina's mandatory death sentence for first
degree murder violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. As
in Gregg, the judgment of the Court was announced by Mr. Justice
Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Stevens. The
plurality listed three shortcomings of the North Carolina statute:54
1) contemporary society has rejected the practice of inexorably
imposing a death sentence upon everyone who is convicted of a
specified offense;55 2) there were no tandardg provided in the stat-
ute to guide a jury in its imposition of the death penalty;" 3) there
is no provision for the consideration of the character and record of
the individual offender as well as the particular acts by which the
crime was committed.
5 7
Mr. Justtice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall, reiterating
their belief in the per se unconstitutionality of the death penalty,
concurred in the judgment. 8
51. The views of the remaining four Justices who voted to uphold capital punishment
per se were spelled out most thoroughly not in the lead case of Gregg, but in a part of Mr.
Justice White's dissenting opinion in Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001, 3008 (1976). Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined in this opinion. The opinion
focused on the widespread acceptance, both past and present, of capital punishment, and on
its legitimacy as an instrument of retribution and deterrence.
52. See notes 2, 3 supra, and accompanying text.
53. 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976). In Woodson, the petitioners were convicted of first degree
murder for their participation in an armed robbery of a convience food store, in the course of
which the cashier was killed and a customer was seriously injured.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Before the Furman decision, the North
Carolina law had provided "that in cases of first-degree murder, the jury in its unbridled
discretion could choose whether the convicted defendant should be sentenced to death or to
life imprisonment." 96 S. Ct. at 2982. After Furman, the North Carolina statute was changed
in order to make the death penalty mandatory for murder in the first-degree.
55. 96 S. Ct. at 2983-90. The Court, however, specifically left open the question of the
constitutionality of a mandatory death penalty statute limited to an extremely narrow cate-
gory of homicide. 96 S. Ct. at 2983 n.7; see note 1 supra and note 63 infra.
56. The court noted that under a mandatory system, juries traditionally have considered
the consequences of a guilty verdict and thus arbitrarily and capriciously refused to return
guilty verdicts in some cases. 96 S. Ct. at 2990-91.
57. Id. at 2991-92.
58. Id. at 2992. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Woodson, disagreed strongly with
each of the three grounds stated by the plurality in support of its conclusion that the North
Carolina statute was unconstitutional. 96 S. Ct. at 2993. However, before analyzing these
three grounds, Justice Rehnquist found a fundamental problem with the majority's unarticu-
lated assumption that the "evolving standards of decency" test provides a basis for declaring
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The Louisiana death penalty statute," which required the im-
position of the death penalty whenever a defendant had been found
guilty of any of five narrowly defined categories of first degree mur-
der'" and which required the jury to be instructed on manslaughter
and second-degree murder regardless of the evidence,"' was held
unconstitutional in Roberts v. Louisiana.62 The plurality held that
even though the category of crimes punishable by death under
Louisiana law was narrower than under North Carolina law, this
was not a difference of constitutional significance."3
Furthermore, the procedure whereby the jury was permitted to
consider the lesser offenses of second-degree murder and man-
slaughter in the absence of any evidence to support such a verdict
invites the capriciousness that was denounced in Furman.64
a punishment cruel and unusual. To Justice Rehnquist, it is not at all clear that the eighth
amendment was not limited to punishments considered cruel and unusual at the time it was
adopted. He then went on to attack the three grounds that the plurality relied on in striking
down the statute.
59. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.30 (1974).
60. The five categories defined in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.30 (1974), are:
1. When the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and
is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnap-
ping, aggravated rape or armed robbery; or
2. When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily harm
upon, a fireman or a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of his
lawful duties; or
3. Where the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm
and has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life
sentence; or
4. When the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm
upon more than one person; [or]
5. When the offender has specific intent to commit murder and has been offered
or has received anything of value for committing the murder.
61. State v. Cooley, 260 La. 768, 257 So.2d 400 (1972); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. Art.
814(A)(1) (Supp. 1975).
62. 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976). In Roberts, petitioner was found guilty of first degree murder
for his participation in an armed robbery of a gas station, in the course of which the attendant
was killed. In order to have found the defendant guilty of any of the five categories of first
degree murder, the jury had to find that the defendant had a specific intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm.
63. The Court noted that one of the five Louisiana categories-the intentional killing by
a person serving a life sentence or by a person previously convicted of an unrelated mur-
der-may be narrow enough to be constitutionally permissible. Although this category still
does not permit the consideration of mitigating factors, it is at least defined in terms of the
character or record of the individual offender. 96 S. Ct. at 3006 n.9. As discussed in note 1
supra, the Supreme Court has now said that it will decide whether category 2, note 60 supra,
is narrow enough to be constitutionally permissible.
64. However, the Court raised no objections to this same procedure in Gregg v. Georgia,
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The Court upheld the discretionary type statutes enacted by
the legislatures of Georgia, 5 Texas," and Florida. 7 These statutes
all provide for a bifurcated procedure. In the first stage, the guilt of
the accused is determined. In the second stage, the penalty is deter-
mined. Prior to the imposition of the death penalty, the sentencing
authority8 must determine the presence of at least one statutory
aggravating factor, consider certain mitigating factors, and then
determine that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating fac-
tors. Furthermore, each state provides for an automatic appellate
review of the death sentence by the state supreme court. The plural-
ity emphasized that this review would insure that the penalty was
imposed with the regularity" required by Furman.70
The Court also held, in each case, that the existence of various
discretionary stages, which are present in all criminal prosecutions,
were not determinative of the issues.
7
1
In Gregg, the defendant was convicted of two counts of armed
robbery and murder. The evidence established that the defendant
and a companion were hitchhiking through Florida when they were
picked up by the two decedents. During a rest stop in Georgia, the
defendant shot the decedents and robbed them. One died from a
bullet wound in the eye and the other died from bullet wounds in
the cheek and back of the head. After finding beyond a reasonable
doubt the presence of two aggravating factors72 the jury imposed the
death penalty.
96 S. Ct. 2909, 2937 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2957 (1976); or Proffitt v. Florida,
96 S. Ct. 2960, 2967 (1976).
65. GA. CODE §§26-3102, 27-2514, -2534.1, -2537 (1975), upheld in Gregg v. Georgia, 96
S.Ct. 2909 (1976).
66. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03 (Vernon 1974); TEX. CalM. PRO. CODE ANN. art.
37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1975-1976), upheld in Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976).
67. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1975), upheld in Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976).
68. The jury determines the sentence in Georgia and Texas. In Florida, the jury gives
an advisory opinion to the trial judge, who then makes the final decision.
69. "Regularity" is the consistent imposition of penalty. Adequate review provides a
check on the capriciousness of any jury by comparing the sentence with that imposed in
previous cases.
70. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2940 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2958
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2969 (1976).
71. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2937 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2957
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2967 (1976).
72. The aggravating factors found were: 1) that the murder was committed while the
defendant was engaged in the commission of two other capital felonies, to wit: the armed
robbery (of each decedent); and 2) that the defendant committed the murder for the purposes
of receiving the decedent's money and automobile.
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In upholding the constitutionality of the Georgia statute, the
Court focused upon three major aspects of the statute: 1) before
imposing the death sentence the jury must find beyond a reasonable
doubt the presence of one of ten statutory aggravating circumstan-
ces; 2) the jury is authorized to consider any appropriate nonstatu-
tory aggravating or mitigating circumstances and in a jury trial the
trial judge is bound by the jury's recommended sentence; and
3) there is an automatic review of each death sentence by the Su-
preme Court of Georgia "to determine whether it was imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor, whether the evidence supports the findings of a statutory
aggravating circumstance, and '[w]hether the sentence of death is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.' -7 Further-
more, the court noted that the Supreme Court of Georgia is required
to specify in its opinion the similar cases which it took into consider-
ation during the review.74
Jurek v. Texas75 can be viewed as the dividing line between a
constitutional and an unconstitutional death penalty scheme. The
defendant in Jurek was convicted of the murder of a ten-year-old
girl "by choking and strangling her with his hands, and by drowning
her in the water, by throwing her into a river . . . in the course of
committing and attempting to commit kidnapping of and forcible
rape upon [her] . ... ,76
The Texas statute, like the Louisiana statute, limits capital
homicides to intentional and knowing murder committed in five
narrow situations: 1) murder of a peace officer or fireman acting in
his official capacity; 2) murder intentionally committed in the
course of a kidnapping, burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or arson;
3) murder committed for remuneration; 4) murder committed dur-
ing a prison escape; and 5) the murder of a penal institution em-
ployee committed by an inmate. However, the Texas statute goes
73. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2939- 40 (1976) (citation omitted).
74. Mr. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, wrote
a concurring opinion dealing primarily with the assertion that Georgia's death penalty proce-
dure was rendered unconstitutional by unbridled prosecutorial discretion. He claimed that
none of the facts support the argument that prosecutors behave arbitrarily in deciding which
cases to try as capital felonies. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2941 (1976).
75. 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976).
76. Id. at 2953 (quoting the indictment with which Jurek was charged).
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one step further than the Louisiana statute, and requires the jury
to answer "yes" to three statutory questions before the imposition
of the death penalty:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant which caused the
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another
would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence whether the conduct of the defen-
dant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the
provocation, if any, by the deceased."
The plurality held that although Texas did not statutorily pro-
vide for the consideration of specific aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances, the combination of the narrowly defined capital crimes
and the statutory questions served the same purpose. "[Tihe
Texas capital-sentencing procedure guides and focuses the jury's
objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the
individual offense and the individual offender before it can impose
a sentence of death."78 This, plus assurance of prompt judicial re-
view in a court of state-wide jurisdiction, avoids freakish or wanton
imposition of the death penalty, and therefore, the statute is consti-
tutional.
IV. Proffitt v. Florida: A LOOK AT FLORIDA LAW
In terms of its impact on Florida law, the most significant opin-
ion handed down by the United States Supreme Court" is Profitt
77. TEx. CRIM. Pao. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. .1975-1976). Before the jury
can impose the death penalty, it must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
answer to the three questions is yes. If the jury finds that the answer to any question is no,
then a sentence of life imprisonment results.
78. Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2957 (1976).
79. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in six other Florida cases. Alvord
v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3234 (1976); Spenkelink v. State,
313 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3227 (1976); Sawyer v. State, 313 So. 2d
680 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3226 (1976); Alford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3227 (1976); Hallman v. State, 305 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 3226 (1976); Sullivan v. State, 303 So: 2d 632 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
3226 (1976). In each case, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall dissented from the
denial of the petition for writ of certiorari on the ground that the imposition of the death
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v. Florida.'" In Proffitt, the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder. The evidence at the trial established that while burglariz-
ing the decedent's house, the defendant stabbed him with a butcher
knife. When the decedent's wife awakened, the defendant hit her
several times with his fist, and then fled.
During the sentencing hearing, the jail physician testified that
the defendant had come to him seeking psychiatric help. The defen-
dant told the physician that he had an uncontrollable desire to kill
that had already resulted in one person's death and that this desire
was building up again. The physician further testified that the de-
fendant was dangerous and would be a danger to his fellow inmates
if imprisoned, but that his condition could be treated successfully.
The Florida death penalty statute provides that upon a con-
viction of a defendant for a capital felony"' the court shall conduct
a separate sentencing hearing before the trial jury to determine
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life im-
prisonment."s After this hearing, the jury determines whether the
penalty constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.
The Court granted certiorari in one Florida case. Gardner v. State, 313 So. 2d 675 (Fla.
1975), cert. granted sub. nom., Gardner v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 3219 (1976). See note 1 supra.
80. 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976). Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice
Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and filed the purality opinion delivered by Mr.
Justice Powell. The Chief Justice, and Justices White, Rehnquist, and Blackmun concurred
in the judgement. Justices Brennan and Marshall each filed a dissenting opinion.
81. In Proffitt, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder in violation of Florida
Statute section 782.04(1)(a) (1975). However, Florida has also classified sexual battery com-
mitted by a person over the age of eighteen upon a person eleven years of age or younger as a
capital felony. FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (2) (1975). As discussed in note 41 supra, and accompany-
ing text, the constitutionality of this statute has not yet been decided.
82. Subsequent to Proffitt, pursuant to a certified question, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida held that where the defendant has pleaded guilty to first degree murder and waived his
right to the advisory jury recommendation, the trial judge may still require this jury hearing.
State v. Carr, 336 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1976).
Another possible constitutional challenge to this procedure concerns the jury selection.
Currently, jurors are excused for cause from the trial venire if they will not impose the death
penalty. However, since the trial venire's determination of guilt or innocence must be made
without regard to the possible penalty, this unfairly deprives the defendant of his right to be
tried by a jury composed of a cross section of the community. In the above situation, the
proper procedure would be to impanel a new jury for the purpose of sentencing, and at this
time allow such challenges for cause. This issue was presented to the Supreme Court of
Florida in Darden v. State, 329 So. 2d 287 (Fla.), cert. granted sub. nom., Darden v. Florida,
97 S. Ct. 308 (1976). The Supreme Court of Florida viewed this contention as unworthy of
consideration. However, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider,
inter alia, the following question: "Were defendant's constitutional rights infringed by exclu-
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mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances, 3 and based upon this, determines the sentence.
sion for cause of five veniremen who acknowledged that to vote for death penalty would
violate their moral and religious principles?" 45 U.S.L.W. 3356. The Supreme Court later
voted 7-2 that they should never have granted certiorari and dismissed the case. 45 U.S.L.W.
(U.S. April 19, 1977). For a case presenting a similar issue, see Davis v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct.
399 (1976), rev'g sub nom., Davis v. State, 236 Ga. 804, 225 S.E.2d 241 (1976).
83. Florida Statute section 921.141 (1975), provides in pertinent part:
(5) AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:
(a) The capital felony wag committed by a porgon under sentence of imprison-
ment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was
an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnap-
ping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of
any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(6) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influ-
ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the
act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by an-
other person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domina-
tion of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
The United States Supreme Court noted that although the aggravating circumstances
that would support the imposition of the death penalty were limited to the eight specified in
the statute, there was no such limitation in the language introducing the list of statutory
mitigating factors. Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2965 n.8 (1976). However, subsequent
to Proffitt, the Florida Supreme Court held that during the sentencing hearing the trial court
properly excluded testimony regarding the defendant's prior employment because "the Legis-
lature chose to list the mitigating circumstances which it judged to be reliable for determining
the appropriateness of a death penalty . . . and we are not free to expand the list." Cooper
v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133, 1139 (Fla. 1976).
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The petitioner in Proffitt asserted that the list of aggravating
circumstances was so vague and broad that it could apply to vir-
tually anyone convicted of first degree murder." Specifically, the
petitioner attacked both the third circumstance, which authorizes
the death penalty if the defendant knowingly creates a risk of death
to many persons, and the eighth circumstance, which authorizes the
death penalty if the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel. The United States Supreme Court held that these factors,
as construed by the Supreme Court of Florida, provided adequate
guidance for the jury. 5 In Proffitt, the trial court had found that the
third factor existed, despite the fact that the defendant attacked
only one person other than the decedent and that this attack was
only with the defendant's fist. However, since the Supreme Court
of Florida, in affirming this decision, did not specifically uphold
each of the four aggravating factors 6 found by the trial court, the
United States Supreme Court relied upon the construction pre-
viously given to this third factor by the Supreme Court of Florida.
In Alvord v. State,"7 which is the only other case in which this third
factor has been found, the defendant murdered two of the victims
in order to avoid a surviving witness to the first murder. The plural-
ity hinted that if this third factor had been the sole circumstance
applied in Proffitt, it would have rendered the factor unconstitu-
tionally broad. 8
The plurality also approved the construction given to the eighth
statutory provision by the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Dixon, that is, "the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnec-
essarily torturous to the victim." 8
After the jury renders an advisory opinion as to the sentence,
the final decision is made by the trial court. The plurality in Proffitt
viewed this unique procedure in a positive light, reasoning that due
84. 96 S. Ct. at 2967-68.
85. Id. at 2968.
86. The other two aggravating factors were (1) that the murder was premeditated and
occurred in the course of a felony; and (2) that the defendant has the propensity to commit
murder. Proffitt v. State, 315 So. 2d 461, 466 (Fla. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976).
87. 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3234 (1976).
88. 96 S. Ct. at 2968 n.13.
89. 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973), cited in Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2968 (1976).
The Supreme Court of Florida has affirmed death sentences in several other cases in which
the eighth statutory factor was found without specifically stating that the homicide was
"pitiless" or "torturous to the victim." 96 S. Ct. at 2968 n.12.
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to the trial court's experience in sentencing, rather than leading to
arbitrariness, this would lead to greater consistency in the imposi-
tion of capital punishment at the trial court level.90 Furthermore, in
order for the trial court to overrule a jury's recommendation of a life
sentence, the facts supporting the death penalty should be so clear
and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.9
In addition, the plurality held that arbitrariness was reduced
by the method the Supreme Court of Florida used to review sent-
ences. Although, unlike the approved Georgia statute, 2 the Florida
statute does not require the consideration of previous cases in which
the death penalty has been imposed, the Supreme Court of Florida
has nevertheless chosen to follow this procedure. This factor, to-
gether with the observation that over one third of the cases reviewed
have been reversed, led the plurality to the conclusion that the
appellate review was performed in a rational and consistent manner
and was not a cursory or rubber stamp review of the trial court's
sentence. 3
The review process utilized by the Supreme Court of Florida
has remained constant. First, the facts and circumstances surround-
ing the crime are recited. Next, pertinent portions of the trial court's
order imposing the death penalty are set forth. This includes the list
of aggravating and mitigating factors found by the trial court to
support the sentence. In Provence v. State,4 where the trial court
did not specify in its order which of the statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances induced it to override the jury's recommendation of life
imprisonment, the sentence was reversed.
The testimony adduced at trial in Provence established that
the defendant and the decedent, Dent, had gone to the Skyway
Bridge to purchase narcotics. After they arrived at the bridge, the
defendant murdered Dent by stabbing him eight times and then
robbing him. On appeal, the State argued that there were two aggra-
vating factors present that could be used to support the trial court's
sentence of death: 1) the murder occurred in the commission of the
90. 96 S. Ct. at 2966.
91. This test was enunciated by the Supreme Court of Florida in Tedder v. State, 322
So. 2d 908, 910 (1975).
92. GA. CODE § 27-2537(c)(3). (Supp. 1975); see Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2939-
41 (1976).
93. 96 S. Ct. at 2969-70.
94. 337 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1976).
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robbery; and 2) the crime was committed for pecuniary gain. The
Supreme Court of Florida held that this constituted only one aggra-
vating factor and that the trial court erred in overruling the jury's
recommendation.
9 5
Likewise, in Thompson v. State," the Supreme Court of Florida
,emphasized the need for the trial court to express "concise and
particular reasons" for overruling a jury's recommendation. In
Thompson, the defendant, who had no prior criminal record, was
convicted of first degree murder. The evidence at trial showed that
the defendant entered the decedent's restaurant and attempted to
take money out of the cash register. A fight ensued when the dece-
dent, armed with a knife, tried to stop the defendant. The defendant
followed the decedent outside, where the fight continued. The de-
fendant subsequently took the decedent's knife and fatally stabbed
him several times. Based upon these facts, the supreme court held
that it was error for the trial court to overrule the jury's recommen-
dation.
The above-mentioned two cases are the only cases this year in
which the Supreme Court of Florida has reversed a death sentence
due to lack of sufficient aggravating circumstances.97
95. Id. at 786.
96. 328 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1976).
97. The death sentence in Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1976), was reversed
because the trial court erred in excluding certain mitigating evidence that the defendant
sought to introduce. The defendant in Messer was convicted of first degree murder and
robbery. The defendant and his codefendant, Brown, were travelling down the Interstate
Highway and stopped at a rest station. The defendant and Brown entered the decedent's car,
held him up and drove him to several locations. Finally, Brown struck the decedent, and the
defendant fatally shot him in the head. The two factors that the defendant was not permitted
to submit to the jury were: 1) the fact that the co-defendant had negotiated a plea of guilty
to second degree murder and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment-the court held that
the jury should have had the benefit of the consequences suffered by the accomplice in
arriving at its recommendation; and 2) psychiatric testimony to establish the mitigating
circumstance that the defendant committed the murder while under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance. The court did not list the aggravating factors that were
found by the trial court. The last death penalty case to be reversed, Tibbs v. State, 337 So.
2d 788 (Fla. 1976), was remanded for a new trial on the ground that there was insufficient
evidence presented to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. Neither aggra-
vating nor mitigating factors were discussed by the court.
The only other case reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida in which a death penalty
recommended by both the jury and the trial court has been reversed is Halliwell v. State,
323 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1975). This case stands, inter alia, for the proposition that the aggravating
circumstances must involve the actual murder of the victim, and not events that occurred
after the victim is already dead. In Halliwell, the defendant became enraged at the victim
after the victim bragged about beating his wife, Sandra, with whom the defendant was in
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In six" of the seven" cases where the death penalty was af-
love. The defendant grabbed a breaker bar and fatally struck the decedent in the head. He
continued to beat the decedent after these first fatal blows were struck. Several hours later,
the defendant dismembered the decedent's body and placed it in Cypress Creek. In mitiga-
tion, the record indicated that the defendant had no prior arrests and was a highly decorated
Green Beret in Vietnam. Furthermore, police officers testified that the defendant was under
emotional strain over the mistreatment of Sandra by the victim and that he was greatly
influenced by Sandra. The supreme court held that the aggravating factor found by the trial
court-that the crime was committed in an extremely heinous, atrocious, and cruel man-
ner-was not supported by the evidence since the murder itself was no more shocking than a
majority of murders, and the dismemberment should not be considered because it occurred
several hours after the actual murder.
98. In Knight v. State, 338 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976), the defendant was convicted of two
counts of first degree murder. The defendant first approached Mr. Gans, one of the decedents,
in the parking lot of Mr. Gans' business. Mr. Gans was forced to drive home, pick up his wife
and proceed to his bankto obtain $50,000. While in the bank, Mr. Gans informed the bank
president of the abduction. Mr. and Mrs. Gans were later found fatally shot through their
necks. Four statutory, aggravating circumstances were found by the trial court: 1) the mur-
ders were committed during the commission of a robbery and/or kidnapping; 2) the murders
were committed to avoid a lawful arrest; 3) the murders were committed for pecuniary gain;
and 4) the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel.
In Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1976), the defendant was convicted of the
robbery of a grocery store and the subsequent murder of a deputy sheriff who attempted to
apprehend the defendant. The deputy had stopped the defendant's car shortly after the
robbery occurred. Thereupon, either the defendant or his accomplice walked over to the
deputy and fired two shots into his head, killing him instantly. The trial court found the
following statutory aggravating circumstances: 1) the defendant was previously convicted of
two armed robberies; 2) the murder was committed while the defendant was in flight after
committing a robbery; 3) the murder was committed to avoid a lawful arrest; and 4) the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. The supreme court disregarded the trial
court's finding of this last factor. See note 102 infra, and accompanying text.
In Darden v. State, 329 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1976), the defendant was convicted of three
crimes: (1) first degree murder, (2) assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree,
and (3) robbery. The evidence adduced at trial showed that the defendant entered the Tur-
mans' furniture store and was in the process of robbing Mrs. Turman when Mr. Turman
arrived. As Mr. Turman enter the store, the defendant fatally shot him between the eyes.
Thereupon, a sixteen-year old boy tried to aid the wounded man, defendant shot this boy in
the mouth, neck and side. Before leaving, the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to force
Mrs. Turman to perform an unnatural sexual act upon him. The supreme court rejected as
grounds for a new trial certain allegedly inflamatory remarks offered by the prosecution. The
court inferentially upheld the trial court's findings of aggravating circumstances and went so
far as to label the crimes as "uniquely vicious" and "heinous." The court further stated that
there were no mitigating circumstances to reduce the penalty from death to life imprison-
ment.
In Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1976), the defendant was convicted of first
degree murder, second degree murder, child torture, and child abuse. In an eight page major-
ity opinion, the supreme court related the details of the crime that supported the finding of
heinousness as an aggravating circumstance.
The defendant murdered his own nine year old daughter, Kelly Ann Dobbert, by
continuous beatings, kicking, hitting with fist and other objects, choking, sewing
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firmed, the trial court specifically found that none of the statutory
mitigating circumstances existed. The most common aggravating
factor is that the crime was committed in an especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel manner. 0 In Cooper v. State,'"' the court reaf-
firmed the construction given to this category in State v. Dixon, '2
and approved by the United States Supreme Court in Proffitt. 113 In
up her cuts with needle and thread and other torture and depriving her of medical
care and finally murdered her, placed her body in a plastic garbage bag and
buried her in an unknown and unmarked grave.
Id. at 436.
In Henry v. State, 328 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1976), the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder. The victim, found in his own bedroom, was bound and gagged with his throat cut.
In addition, there were extensive head and facial wounds caused by blunt force. The actual
cause of death was by suffocation from the gag which had been placed so tightly under the
defendant's tongue that it forced the tongue back into the throat and cut off the airway. The
following aggravating circumstances were found: 1) the defendant was previously convicted
of a felony involving the threat of violence; 2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain;
and 3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel.
In Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976), the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder. The decedent and his wife were driving in their car when the defendant drove up
behind them and ordered them to pull over. The defendant had lived with the decedent's
wife on prior occasions. The defendant held a rifle on the decedent and forced him to proceed
to a wooded area. The defendant then forced the decedent and his wife to perform various
sexual acts. Thereupon, the defendant struck the victim in the head with his rifle, and then
shot him three times in the head. The trial court found that the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, and cruel.
99. In Meeks v. State, 336 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 1976), the only mitigating factor was the
age (21) and the intelligence (dull-normal) of the defendant. The defendant was convicted of
first degree murder by stabbing the decedent after she caught him trying to steal money from
the cash register in her store. As aggravating circumstances, the trial court found that the
defendant had previously been convicted of a capital felony, that the murder was committed
in the course of a robbery and for pecuniary gain, and that the murder was committed to
prevent arrest and to hinder the enforcement of the laws.
100. See Knight v. State, 338 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976); Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133
(Fla. 1976); Darden v. State, 329 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1976); Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433
(Fla. 1976); Henry v. State, 328 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1976); and Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 13
(Fla. 1976). Furthermore, this is the only aggravating factor that has been used by itself as
the basis for imposing the death penalty.
101. 336 So. 2d 1133, 1140-41 (Fla. 1976).
102. It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or shock-
ingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and, that cruel
means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference.to, or even
enjoyment of, the suffering of others. What is intended to be included are those
capital crimes where the actual commission of the capital felony was accompa-
nied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital
felonies-the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to
the victim.
283 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
103. 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2968.
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Cooper, the Supreme Court of Florida discounted the trial court's
finding of heinousness for the execution-type, but instantaneous
and painless killing of a deputy. However, the remaining aggravat-
ing circumstances were sufficient to uphold the death sentence.' 04
The Supreme Court of Florida used the "comparison" test, in
which the facts of the case are compared with the facts in other
similar cases, only once this year. In Provence, 105 the supreme court
found that the aggravating circumstances present were less severe
than in at least four other cases previously considered by the court,
two of which had been remanded for the imposition of a life sent-
ence.10
6
Therefore, the process used by the Supreme Court of Florida to
review death sentences, coupled with the fact that slightly less than
forty percent of the cases this year have been reversed, leads to the
conclusion that the death penalty currently is being imposed within
constitutional boundries. However, future decisions should be care-
fully analyzed for there may come a time when the Supreme Court
of Florida reverses such a substantial number of sentences that the
few remaining affirmed sentences must also be reversed. 7
V. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Avenues of constitutional challenge that were not specifically
addressed by the United States Supreme Court remain open for
litigation. 08 In light of Provence, it is questionable whether the ag-
gravating factor of committing a capital felony for pecuniary gain
would, by itself, support the imposition of the death penalty. If the
Supreme Court of Florida continues to make such comparisons, one
or more of the aggravating categories may be rendered unconstitu-
tional under the regularity or disproportionality test.0 9 Further-
more, the Supreme Court of Florida now has restricted the mitigat-
ing factors to those listed in the statute. This contradicts one of the
104. Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1976).
105. 337 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1976).
106. Id. at 786-87.
107. This would be a return to the "rarity" and "freakishness" denounced by the concur-
ring Justices in Furman.
108. See note 82 supra.
109. It is important to note that the United States Supreme Court considered the consti-
tutionality of only two of the eight statutory aggravating circumstances.
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assumptions made by the United States Supreme Court in
Proffitt. Ito
In addition, the "evolving standards of decency" test may re-
quire the employment of a more humane method of carrying out the
sentence than electrocution. Substantive due process as well as the
,eighth amendment may require that the least painful method avail-
able must now be used.'
11
Finally, the constitutional challenge most likely to succeed is
directed against the imposition of the death penalty for the crime
of rape."' There are currently eighty-two"' people on death row in
Florida. Of these, two have been convicted of rape and two of sexual
battery."' Thus, at least four lives would be affected by a decision
on this issue.
VI. EPILOGUE
The only major effect that Proffitt will have on Florida cases
will be to sharpen the appellate review process. Proffitt encourages
the use of case-comparison to insure regularity and proportionality
in the imposition of the death penalty."' Likewise, the Supreme
Court of Florida must continue to require specific findings of fact
regarding the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstan-
ces. Having obtained the stamp of approval from the United States
Supreme Court, the focus will now shift to the methods of actually
carrying out the penalty."6
110. See note 83 supra.
111. In In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1880), the United States Supreme Court held that
execution by electrocution did not result in a denial of due process. This result was reaffirmed
in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), where the Court held that a
second attempt at electrocution where the first attempt had failed was not a denial of due
process because of cruelty. However, since these cases were decided, respectively, one-
hundred years ago, and thirty years ago, this point seems ready for reconsideration.
112. The Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 n.35 explicitly left this point
open. See notes 41, 81 supra and accompanying text. This particular issue was dealt with
very recently in a landmark case. See Coker v. Georgia, 45 U.S.L.W. 4961 (U.S. June 26,
1977).
113. Letter from David S. Mitchell, Statistics Supervisor of the Florida Department of
Offender Rehabilitation, to Irwin P. Stotzky (December 27, 1976).
114. Id.
115. 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2966-67 (1976).
116. Possible constitutional arguments in this regard may center around the right to be
executed immediately, without the automatic statutory review and the right to privacy dur-
ing an execution. See note 35 supra. Recent newspaper articles contain information regarding
the form of the death warrant (Miami Herald, Nov. 11, 1976, § A, at 16, col. 1) and the
implementation of rules controlling executive clemency and pardons (Miami Herald, Nov.
10, 1976, § A, at 12, col. 1).
19771
